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Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: 
An Extraordinary Success or an Ordinary Failure? 
Vamika Jain | University of Toronto ’22 
 
“They killed men with sticks, tied them up by the neck, and 
burned them alive… one could no longer drink the water 
because there were so many corpses floating on the 
surface… Every day we lived in fear, in poverty, in grief, in 
a tragedy that we had never before known.” 
 
Pech Tum Kravel spoke these words in a witness statement, 
testifying to the inhumanity of the Khmer Rouge at the 1979 
People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT) in Cambodia.1 Along with 
Kravel’s deposition, the tribunal itself has remained obscure for 
decades, dismissed from both domestic and international attention. 
The fledgling PRT marked the beginning of a long struggle for 
transitional justice in Cambodia.2 The most recent iteration of this 
campaign is the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid tribunal intended to prosecute leaders 
of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime for their blatant violations 
 
1 “Mr. Pech Tum Kravel,” in Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial 
of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, eds. Howard De Nike, John Quigley, and Kenneth J. 
Robinson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 102.   
2 Rachel Hughes, “Ordinary Theatre and Extraordinary Law at the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33, no. 4 (2015): 
717-9. 




of both Cambodian and international law. The tribunal offered the 
Cambodian people an opportunity for “moving forward through 
justice”—but after twenty-three years, has it delivered on its 
promises?3 Such questions on the effectiveness of this long and 
expensive tribunal deserve to be addressed. The present study will 
argue that while the ECCC has certainly failed in delivering the 
most fundamental conceptions of material justice—including truth, 
accountability, and appropriate punishment—it has also achieved 
remarkable success in supporting victim participation, generating 
public deliberation, and encouraging national reconciliation. 
Highlighting these areas of success, the article looks at the 
expanded role of tribunals extending beyond the courtroom and 
seeks to illustrate the perceptions of justice that exist beyond a 
court’s verdict.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Examining the ECCC’s effectiveness requires a robust analytical 
framework. In order to provide theoretical grounding for such a 
framework, this paper identifies the hybrid tribunal as a form of 
transitional justice, which the International Centre for Transitional 
Justice broadly defines as “ways countries emerging from periods 
 
3 “It’s Time for the Record to be Set Straight” (poster printed by Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, March 3, 2011), 
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/publication/its-time-record-be-set-straight. 




of conflict and repression address large-scale or systematic human 
rights violations.”4 Prominent legal scholar Ruti Tietel narrows this 
definition by arguing that it applies specifically to ideas of “justice 
associated with periods of political change,” such as regime 
changes or shifts in authority, and primarily involves addressing 
the “wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes” through 
various legal responses such as prosecutions, truth commissions, 
reparations, and political reform.5 As a tribunal established by both 
the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia to 
prosecute violations of humanitarian law by its predecessor regime 
of Democratic Kampuchea, the ECCC fits this definition.6 Policy 
scholar David Crocker has identified eight primary goals for such 
mechanisms of transitional justice: “truth, a public platform for 
victims, accountability and punishment, the rule of law, 
compensation to victims, institutional reform and long-term 
development, reconciliation, and public deliberation.”7 Here these 
 
4 “What is Transitional Justice?” International Centre of Transitional Justice, 
https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice.  
5 Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 16 (2003): 69; Michael Newman, Transitional Justice: Contending with 
the Past (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2019), 27-47. 
6 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes 
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, United Nations- 
Cambodia, June 6, 2003, 2329 UNTS 117.  
7 David A. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework,” 
Ethics & International Affairs 13 (1999): 43-64. 




eight goals will be used as the basic structure for measuring the 
ECCC’s success. However, Crocker’s goals are occasionally 
simplistic and blind to relevant historical narratives. Moreover, 
they are specific to liberal and democratic political transitions, and 
are intended to ambiguously apply to all forms of transitional 
justice, not just tribunals. Conversely, scholars such as Theresa 
Squatrito et al. and Gutner and Thompson have developed 
analytical frameworks that apply specifically to international 
organizations and tribunals, while historians such as Rebecca 
Gidley have altered these models to the distinctive context of 
Cambodian history.8 This article will employ research in political 
theory and historical narratives from Gidley and Squatrito et al. to 
modify Crocker’s goals, overcome some of their limitations, and 





8 Theresa Squatrito, Oran R. Young, Andreas Follesdal, and Geir Ulfstein, “A 
Framework for Evaluating the Performance of International Courts and 
Tribunals,” in The Performance of International Courts and Tribunals, eds. 
Theresa Squatrito, Oran R. Young, Andreas Follesdal, and Geir Ulfstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 3-36; Tamar Gutner and 
Alexander Thompson, “The Politics of IO Performance: A Framework,” Review 
of International Organizations 5, no. 3 (2010): 227–248; Rebecca Gidley, 
Illiberal Transitional Justice and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2019). 




Historical Background: Democratic Kampuchea 
In April 1975, the French-educated revolutionary Pol Pot led the 
rebel forces of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), also 
known as the Khmer Rouge, as they took over Cambodia and 
proclaimed the new state of “Democratic Kampuchea.”9 While 
numerous factors contributed to the radicalization that spurred on 
the Khmer Rouge, a primary reason was the U.S. government’s 
secret bombing campaign against Vietnamese troops in Cambodia 
in the latter years of the Vietnam War.10 Further destabilizing the 
nation’s already-weakened regime and alienating large 
communities of Cambodians, these falling bombs were the last 
straw required by the Khmer Rouge to break government defences 
and take control of Phnom Penh.  
What followed was the attempted establishment of absolute 
control and a subsequent devastation of Cambodian lives. As 
recorded in endless pages of harrowing testimony, soldiers forcibly 
deported Cambodians to the countryside, “sieved [intellectuals and 
civil servants] from the population,” punished disobedience with 
brutal executions—typified by “the naked body of a man, nailed to 
a door”—and regularly committed mass killings, one of which 
counted “one hundred fifty-seven persons, which included women 
 
9 Aaron Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals: A Comparative Examination (New 
York: Springer, 2015), 2-4. 
10 Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals, 3.  




eight months pregnant.”11 The Khmer Rouge remained in power 
until a Vietnamese invasion in January 1979. Estimates suggest 
that between 1.5 to 2.25 million Cambodians died under the four-
year regime due to “targeted killings, starvation, overwork, and 
lack of sanitation and medical care.”12 The wounds carved onto 
Cambodian bodies and the Cambodian nation, however, are much 
larger in number, and the process to deliver justice to victims took 
decades to begin.  
 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
“The creation of the Cambodia Tribunal—spanning 1997 to 
2006—took longer than the creation of any other international or 
hybrid criminal tribunal in the post-Cold War era,” recalled David 
Scheffer, former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes 
Issues.13 Notably, it took nearly eighteen years from the fall of 
Democratic Kampuchea in 1979 for this process to even begin at 
 
11 “Mrs. Yasuko Naito,” in Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of 
Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, eds. Howard De Nike, John Quigley, and Kenneth J. 
Robinson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 96-101; Peter 
Manning, Transitional Justice and Memory in Cambodia (London: Routledge, 
2019), 39.  
12 Ben Kiernan, “The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death 
Tolls in Cambodia, 1975–79, and East Timor, 1975–80,” Critical Asian Studies 
35: 585-597; Rachel Hughes and Maria Elander, “Justice and The Past,” in The 
Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia, eds. Katherine Brickell and Simon 
Springer (Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2016), 42.  
13 David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes 
Tribunals (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 343. 




an international level. This was because, for most of the 1980s and 
early 1990s, the Khmer Rouge was protected by the geopolitical 
dynamics between China, America, and the Soviet Union, 
remaining key political players in the Cambodian government.14 
This made their prosecution impossible; any minor attempts at 
justice, such as at the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal of 1979, 
were soon dismissed due to their lack of public and international 
support. 15 It was only in 1996 when Ieng Sary, co-founder of the 
Khmer Rouge, agreed to disarm remaining rebel troops in 
exchange for amnesty that his faction’s political influence began to 
falter.16 Coinciding with the party’s weakened grip on power and 
growing international interest in action against its leaders, the co-
prime ministers of Cambodia finally wrote a letter to the United 
Nations Secretary General in 1997, requesting support in “bringing 
to justice those persons responsible for the genocide and crimes 
against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge.”17 The 
process that this letter began remained slow, hindered by domestic 
red tape and international power politics. The UN and the 
Cambodian government engaged on multiple points of contention, 
 
14 Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals, 32-33. 
15 Hughes, “Ordinary Theatre and Extraordinary Law,” 717-19. 
16 Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals, 35-36. 
17 Gidley, Illiberal Transitional History, 109; United Nations General Assembly, 
“Letter Dated 21 June 1997 from the First and Second Prime Ministers of 
Cambodia Addressed to the Secretary-General,” A/51/930, 24 June 1997. 




such as the precise composition of the ECCC and the court’s 
standing with respect to the Cambodian legal system.18 After 
multiple rounds of negotiations, the UN General Assembly passed 
the final agreement on the ECCC on 22 May 2003, with conditions 
and concessions on both sides. The years immediately after were 
spent fundraising and laying administrative framework until, in 
July 2006, the judges for the court were sworn in and the ECCC 
was officially functional.19 
 
Structure of the Court 
The ECCC has jurisdiction over crimes committed between 17 
April 1975 and 6 January 1979.20 The crimes that the court can 
adjudicate are genocide, crimes against humanity, and breaches of 
the Geneva Convention. The persons that it can prosecute are 
carefully defined as the “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea 
and those who were most responsible.”21 The structure of the court 
 
18 Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals, 40-41.  
19 Fichtelberg, Hybrid Tribunals, 44-45.  
20 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia, art. 1; Ernestine E. Meijer, “The Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia for Prosecuting Crimes Committed by the Khmer Rouge: 
Jurisdiction, Organization, and Procedure of an Internationalized National 
Tribunal,” in Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Sierra Leone, 
Kosovo and Cambodia, eds. Cesare P. R. Romano, André Nollkaemper, and 
Jann K. Kleffner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 211.   
21 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia, art. 9, 2; Meijer, “The Extraordinary Chambers,” 212-14.  




itself is two-tiered, with a Trial Chamber and a Supreme Court 
Chamber that serves as both “appellate chamber and final 
instance.” The court’s composition is a unique hybrid model 
wherein the Trial Chamber consists of three Cambodian and two 
international judges, and the Supreme Court Chamber consists of 
four Cambodian and three international judges. Judges must seek 
unanimity in their decisions but, when impossible, a supermajority 
of at least four judges in the Trial Chamber and five judges in the 
Supreme Court Chamber is acceptable.22 Finally and most 
importantly, the Cambodian government has an obligation to 
provide support, enforce decisions, and make arrests “without 
undue delay” based on requests made by the ECCC.23  
 
Critical Assessment: Truth 
Having established the foundations of the ECCC’s history and 
mandate, it is now essential to assess its effectiveness. The first 
measure for examining the performance of this delayed and 
carefully constructed hybrid tribunal is the goal of “truth.” 
According to David Crocker, this involves investigating, 
establishing, and disseminating a true record of past atrocities and 
 
22 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia, art. 3, 4; Meijer, “The Extraordinary Chambers,” 217-21. 
23 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia, art. 25.  




their consequences, allowing victims and future generations to 
engage with an accurate public account of how various 
occurrences have shaped their past and present.24 Crocker indicates 
that the ability to arrive at such a record is dependent on the 
process of investigation.25 Therefore, to assess the ECCC, this 
article expands Crocker’s definition to include the measure of 
“process performance.” Proposed by Squatrito et al., this refers to 
demonstrated procedural fairness and efficiency standards in court 
and tribunal proceedings.26 Therefore, the ECCC’s performance 
under the goal of “truth” is measurable at two levels: the process 
performance of the court as a justice-seeking mechanism, and the 
successful dissemination of an accurate historical record. 
 The first measure under process performance is procedural 
fairness. Unfortunately, despite the painstaking process of 
negotiating the ECCC’s composition, multiple allegations of 
political interference by the Cambodian government in defence of 
certain Khmer Rouge leaders have mired its proceedings.27 The 
most serious of these allegations pertain to Cases 003 and 004 at 
the ECCC, wherein the defendants are former mid-level leaders of 
 
24 Crocker, “Reckoning,” 49-50.  
25 Crocker, “Reckoning,” 51-52. 
26 Squatrito et al., “A Framework,” 16.  
27 Tomas Hamilton and Michael Ramsden, “The Politicisation of Hybrid Courts: 
Observations from the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,” 
International Criminal Law Review 14, no. 1 (2014): 115. 




the CPK. The Cambodian judges of both chambers and team of 
Cambodian prosecutors have consistently prevented the 
proceedings from moving forward in court, and the Cambodian 
police has not issued arrest warrants, leading international co-
prosecutor Andrew Cayley to claim that the government had 
planned to protect the cases’ defendants.28 These allegations of 
political interference significantly undermine both the investigation 
and the alleged veracity of its produced historical record. 
Furthermore, the continued prevalence of former Khmer Rouge 
leaders and combatants in Cambodian political life means that 
allegations of corruption are rampant against all levels of the 
ECCC’s administration.29 While the veracity of these claims has 
not been established, the sheer number of them certainly casts a 
shadow on procedural fairness.  
On efficiency, moreover, the ECCC has only succeeded in 
convicting three defendants over the course of seventeen years, 
with an expenditure of more than $300 million.30 Its hybrid nature 
and the inherent conflict between national and international 
interests has caused its proceedings to move at a painstakingly 
 
28 Kheang Un, "The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A Politically Compromised Search 
for Justice," The Journal of Asian Studies 72, no. 4 (2013): 78. 
29 Hamilton and Ramsden, “The Politicization of Hybrid Courts,” 129-131. 
30 Seth Mydans, “11 Years, $300 Million and 3 Convictions. Was the Khmer 
Rouge Tribunal Worth It?” April 10, 2017, The New York Times. 




slow pace, with an exceptionally inefficient use of resources.31 The 
record of truth that the ECCC is making available to the public is 
thus heavily limited in comparison with what could be possible 
with a more efficient usage of time and resources. 
The second level of assessment, examining the court’s 
ability to make available an accurate public record of the historical 
wrongdoings suffered by Cambodians, reveals further failures and 
concerns. Craig Etcheson, former chief of investigations at the 
ECCC’s Office of Co-Prosecutors, describes how the court’s 
remarkably rich archival record of testimony and trial-proceedings 
is inaccessible to the Cambodian public, to scholars, and to 
international parties alike. He states that while the government has 
established a Legal Documentation Centre, it has not been updated 
beyond a partial documentation of Case 001. The state remains 
hesitant to provide any further access.32 More significantly, 
scholars are worried that under the hybrid nature of this court the 
Cambodian government will seize all documentation after the 
completion of the ECCC’s mandate. This would mean that “printed 
documents could be selectively destroyed, and the electronic 
 
31 Mikkel Jarle Christensen and Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, “Competing 
Perceptions of Hybrid Justice: International v. National in the Extraordinary 
Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia," International Criminal Law Review 18, 
no. 1 (2018): 127-53. 
32 Craig Etcheson, Extraordinary Justice: Law, Politics and the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunals (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 348. 




version could be subtly altered,” completely falsifying the record 
of truth being established by the court.33 
Therefore, assessing the ECCC’s progress towards the goal 
of “truth” reveals significant failures of process performance, 
challenged fairness, inefficient proceedings, and an unreliable 
production of historical records that are largely inaccessible to 
Cambodians.  
 
Public Platform for Victims 
Crocker’s second goal for transitional justice is the provision of a 
public platform for victims of past atrocities to describe their 
experiences.34 When applying this measure to the ECCC, however, 
it is important to note that these proceedings are taking place 
nearly three decades after the fall of the Khmer Rouge. This adds 
distinctive challenges to both the process of reaching out to victims 
and asking them to relive harrowing memories from a generation 
ago. 
 The ECCC has a dedicated section for Victim Support that 
engages in regular legal outreach, inviting victims to participate in 
trial proceedings. Victim Support must ensure the protection of 
victim interests by effectively disseminating relevant information, 
 
33 Grant Peck, “Experts Weigh the Record of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal,” Associated Press, November 17, 2018. 
34 Crocker, “Reckoning,” 52-53. 




ensuring legal representation, and acting as a bridge between the 
co-prosecutors and the victims.35 Estimates suggest that this branch 
has contacted “more than half a million Cambodians within 
Cambodia, and some thousands in the diaspora,” overcoming the 
challenges of lost time since the fall of the Democratic 
Kampuchea.36 Outreach to diaspora Cambodians indicates that 
even those who have moved away from the immediate proximity 
to the proceedings and their consequences have received the 
opportunity to reckon with and seek justice for past sufferings.  
 Victim participation in the proceedings operates under two 
primary mechanisms. The first is the process of filing a 
“complaint,” wherein victims can submit information to the court. 
Investigators and prosecutors may use this information and may 
call the complainant to present evidence at trial.37 The second 
option for victims is participating in the proceedings as a “civil 
party,” having demonstrated that they directly suffered due to the 
crimes committed by the defendants. Civil parties have co-lawyers 
to represent them and have specific rights within the trial, such as 
 
35 “Victims Support Section,” Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/victims-support-section. 
36 Hughes and Elander, “Justice and the Past,” 49.  
37 Hughes and Elander, “Justice and the Past,” 47; “EXTRAORDINARY 
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA INTERNAL RULES 
(REV.9),” Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 
January 16, 2015. 




the right to call witnesses or to make submissions, appeals, and 
closing statements. While only ninety civil parties participated in 
Case 001, around 4,000 parties did so in Case 002, representing the 
success of Victim Support’s legal outreach and the ECCC’s ability 
to provide a platform to victims. 38 While victim rights at trial have 
certainly seen restrictions in recent years, including the 
consolidation of multiple civil rights claims and the distribution of 
the case into mini-trials, the rate of victim participation and the 
degree of outreach conducted remain remarkable.39 Furthermore, 
described as ground-breaking legal precedent by international legal 
scholars, the ECCC is one of the first international courts to 
implement civil party participation at such a scale.40 This indicates 
that under the goal of providing a public platform for victims, the 
ECCC demonstrates significant success. 
 
Accountability and Punishment 
According to Crocker, successful mechanisms of transitional 
justice must be able to hold those responsible for historical 
 
38 Hughes and Elander, “Justice and the Past,” 48.  
39 Mélanie Vianney-Liaud, “Emerging Voices: Victim Participation in ICC and 
ECCC’s Proceedings,” Opinio Juris, August 20, 2015. 
40 Sarah Thomas and Terith Chy, “Including the Survivors in the Tribunal 
Process,” in On Trial: The Khmer Rouge Accountability Process, eds. John D. 
Ciorciari and Anne Heindel (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 
2009), 214.  




atrocities accountable for their crimes and must deliver appropriate 
punishment to such individuals.41 Expanding on this definition, 
Squatrito et al. argue that the ability of tribunals to successfully 
hold defendants accountable is dependent on the court’s ability to 
successfully resolve judicial disputes and arrive at decisions.42 
Therefore, to prove effective at the goal of accountability and 
punishment, the ECCC must show demonstrated success at dispute 
resolution and at delivering appropriate punishments to those who 
are responsible for the horrifying scale of suffering under the 
Khmer Rouge.  
 The hybrid nature of the court, with a mix of international 
and national judges, prosecutors, and investigators at each level of 
the system, results in a consistent conflict of interests among the 
primary decision-makers of the process.43 Etcheson narrates how 
tension between these duelling perspectives is present at 
foundational levels of the process, recalling how “internationals 
were focused on procedure and process, while the nationals were 
focused on politics and product” at every step.44 Since decision-
making requires either unanimity or supermajority, this binary 
cleavage has significantly disabled the court’s ability to make 
 
41 Crocker, “Reckoning,” 53-54. 
42 Squatrito et al., “A Framework,” 14.  
43 Christensen and Pederson, “Competing Perceptions,” 144-45.  
44 Etcheson, Extraordinary Justice, 341.  




efficient progress in the prosecution and punishment of criminals 
on trial.45 The necessity for a supermajority, in conjunction with 
the binary divide within the judges, also means that the likelihood 
of the dismissal of conflicts without decision is extremely high.46 
These drawbacks in the ECCC’s dispute resolution and decision-
making capacities significantly reduce its ability to successfully 
agree upon the accountability and punishment of various 
defendants that stand trial within it. 
 Furthermore, the ECCC’s scope is limited to a strict 
definition of the most “senior leaders” of the Khmer Rouge—i.e., 
those who were most responsible for committing crimes. Defining 
this category, however, is fraught with subjective claims of 
leadership and responsibility. The Cambodian government’s 
resistance towards prosecuting Case 003 and Case 004 is partly 
because the defendants were not part of the top echelon of Khmer 
Rouge leadership. 47 Prosecuting them would then open the doors 
for the widespread prosecution of several other officials at a 
similar level in the regime. Nevertheless, in spite of their non-
seniority, the defendants were responsible for approximately 
40,000 deaths, and therefore bear a massive burden of 
 
45 Christensen and Penderson, “Competing Perceptions,” 144-45; Etcheson, 
Extraordinary Justice, 340-343.   
46 Meijer, “The Extraordinary Chambers,” 217-21.  
47 Un, “The Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” 78. 




responsibility for the genocide and crimes against humanity 
committed.48 The challenges faced by the court in the prosecution 
of cases such as 003 and 004 are indicative of limitations on its 
capacity to hold prominent criminals responsible for their actions. 
Additionally, hurdles faced by the ECCC include the fact that its 
proceedings are underway more than three decades after the crimes 
were committed. Not only does this mean that many of the most 
responsible leaders have died without punishment, but it also 
makes the process of tracing and identifying such individuals 
additionally difficult.49  
 Therefore, these limitations encumber the ECCC’s 
effectiveness under the goal of holding wrongdoers accountable for 
their crimes and assigning them appropriate punishment.  
 
Rule of Law 
Crocker’s fourth goal of transitional justice states that, in 
reckoning with past wrongs, compliance with the rule of law is 
necessary, as is the attempt to lay groundwork for the future 
development of law. Squatrito et. al. applies a similar framework 
when assessing the effectiveness of international courts and 
tribunals. They identify the “[facilitation of] compliance with 
 
48 Christensen and Penderson, “Competing Perceptions,” 151. 
49 Duncan McCargo, “Politics by Other Means? The Virtual Trials of the Khmer 
Rouge Tribunal," International Affairs 87, no. 3 (2011): 614-15. 




international law” and the “clarification of law” as two important 
measures for the outcome performance of court systems such as 
the ECCC.50  
 The hybridity of the ECCC makes it a unique legal 
precedent formed within the confines of Cambodian law, but with 
roots situated in an agreement signed between the United Nations 
and the Cambodian government.51 On the one hand, its definitions 
of the crimes within its scope draw heavily from international 
conventions such as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the 1998 Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court.52 On the other, the chambers 
themselves exists within the Courts of Cambodia; the Cambodian 
government enforces the tribunal’s decisions and administrators 
draw most procedural rules from the national legal system.53 
Consequently, the tribunal has the striking position of facilitating 
compliance with, establishing precedent for, and clarifying both 
international law and domestic law simultaneously. Importantly, it 
 
50 Squatriro et al., “A Framework,” 10-11.  
51 Anne Heindel, “Overview of the Extraordinary Chambers,” in On Trial: The 
Khmer Rouge Accountability Process, eds. John D. Ciorciari and Anne Heindel 
(Phnom Pneh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2009), 85. 
52 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia, art. 9, 2.; Meijer, “The Extraordinary Chambers,” 212-14.  
53 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia, art. 25; Heindel, “Overview,” 85-107.  




also sets further precedent for future tribunals seeking similar 
hybrid models. 
 While the ECCC is not the only hybrid tribunal in 
contemporary history, its model for victim participation was 
certainly unprecedented when first established, replicated only 
partly at the International Criminal Court at The Hague. Never 
before had victims for mass human rights violations “been 
accorded such a highly visible role as ‘civil parties’ in the criminal 
proceedings against their oppressors.”54 The ECCC goes a step 
beyond simple participation by affording victim rights to civil 
parties at trial proceedings, and has since engaged with these rights 
on multiple occasions, both restraining and expanding them.55 This 
creates a wealth of replicable legal procedures future international 
courts and tribunals that might be established in the future. 
 Unfortunately, since most of the ECCC’s proceedings are 
still ongoing and public access to documentation on trial 
proceedings and decisions remains limited, it is not yet evident 
what the court’s holistic role in clarifying or advancing 
international and domestic law has been.56 However, its striking 
 
54 Thomas and Chy, “Including the Survivors,” 286.   
55 Ken Gee-kin Ip, “Fulfilling the Mandate of National Reconciliation in the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) – An Evaluation 
through the Prism of Victims’ Rights,” International Criminal Law Review 13, 
no. 4 (2013): 865-94. 
56 Etcheson, Extraordinary Justice, 346.  




placement at a cross-section of international and domestic law, and 
its unprecedented employment of victim participation mechanisms 
indicate that it is well-placed to leave a measurable impact on both.     
 
Compensation to Victims 
Crocker’s fifth goal for transitional justice is that all victims of 
human rights violations must receive appropriate compensation, 
“in the form of income, property, medical services or educational 
and other opportunities.”57 Once again, the timing of the ECCC’s 
proceedings complicates the direct application of this goal. While 
identifying and verifying victims after the significant gap of time is 
already a challenging process, to appropriately measure and 
allocate material compensation would be nearly impossible. The 
court’s internal rules have consequently established that victims 
can only seek “collective and moral” reparations from its 
proceedings.58 To assess whether the ECCC is able to demonstrate 
any success at this goal, it is important to examine whether such 
non-material and non-individualistic reparations are acceptable to 
the victims. A population-based survey conducted after a 
successful conviction at the ECCC’s first trial asked participants 
what they thought would be the best way to offer individual 
 
57 Crocker, “Reckoning,” 57. 
58 “EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 
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reparations to victims of the Khmer Rouge. While more 
respondents recommended that victims and families should receive 
social services such as education and healthcare, the second most 
popular recommendation was for “trials and punishment of 
wrongdoers.”59 This indicates that while the ECCC’s moral 
reparations might not be the most desirable option, they are 
certainly a close second for contemporary Cambodians. Therefore, 
while the ECCC is unable to offer any material compensation to 
victims of the Khmer Rouge, its efforts at prosecuting the greatest 
culprits certainly offer some form of restitution to those who have 
suffered most at its hands.   
 
Institutional Reform and Long-Term Government  
Crocker defines his sixth goal for transitional justice as the 
prevention of recurring conflict and human rights violations 
through the establishment of stronger institutions and economic 
development.60 As a tribunal, the ECCC plays little to no role in 
the advancement of economic development. Furthermore, since the 
ECCC involves multiple international actors, concerns over 
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national sovereignty limit the degree to which the government 
allows it to participate within it. However, a fair assessment of the 
court’s role in institution building in Cambodia must examine its 
impact on the health of Cambodian legal institutions.  
 Since the 1997 letter from the co-prime ministers of 
Cambodia to the UN Secretary General, international and national 
staff have worked together at various levels to build, operate, and 
sustain the ECCC.61 Scholars, lawyers, administrators, lobbyists, 
diplomats, and journalists from around the world have spent 
decades working with the Cambodian government to ensure the 
sustenance of this tribunal. Gidley describes how the International 
Bar Association has conducted training sessions in international 
law for Cambodian lawyers, and how the Defence Support and 
Victim Support sections have provided relevant training programs 
to law students, while Etcheson reflects on the possibility of skill-
transfer after decades of collaboration.62 Two-way exchanges of 
knowledge and experience are inevitable, and this heavy 
engagement with international bodies will act as a model of best 
practices for Cambodian institutions, making them robust enough 
to survive periods of political unrest.63  
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Given these circumstances, the ECCC has contributed 
significantly, within the confines of its role, to the strengthening of 
domestic institutions in Cambodia. 
 
Reconciliation 
Crocker’s seventh goal is the ideal of national reconciliation, or the 
ability for former enemies to work toward greater social 
cohesion.64 While the ECCC’s proceedings are far from complete 
and its full impact on the social and psychological underpinnings 
of Cambodian life is yet to be seen, the tribunal’s public 
proceedings have caused Cambodians to directly confront the 
horrors of their past. For decades, victims of inhumane suffering 
persisted through a political system that continued to place their 
oppressors in positions of power. 65 Growing accustomed to this 
suppressed history, only 64% of respondents to a population-based 
survey in 2008 indicated that truth and justice were important steps 
towards reconciliation. However, as the first trial ended, this figure 
jumped to 81% of respondents in 2010, indicating that the trial and 
its outreach system were allowing Cambodians to recognize the 
importance of confronting their past, their trauma, and their former 
enemies.66 Additionally, a vast spectrum of local and international 
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NGOs, some trained and supported by the United Nations and 
others developing grassroots support, have emerged around the 
ECCC, particularly its Victim Support Section. These 
organizations have developed a significant number of operations 
such as reconciliation walks, public forums of discussion, 
documentation laboratories, therapy centres, informal hearings, 
and more to advance outreach and reconcile Cambodian victims.67 
The impetus for these efforts and much of the initial support they 
received would have been impossible without the ECCC. 
Therefore, while history will observe the ECCC’s broader impact 
on national reconciliation in upcoming decades, the tribunal has 
effectively sparked the process within Cambodian society.  
 
Public Deliberation 
Crocker’s final goal states that any attempt at transitional justice 
must generate active engagement in the public sphere, open 
deliberation, and marked interest in its progress.68 Not only does 
this ensure the wider dissemination of its goals and incentives, it 
also generates greater transparency and public investment in its 
sustained success. Remarkably, the Khmer Rouge tribunal has 
commanded an unprecedented degree of international and national 
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public engagement for the entirety of its ongoing duration. By 
September 2017, nearly 550,000 people had attended hearings 
from the courts’ public galleries.69 The ECCC outreach program, 
assisted by donors from around the world, disseminated regular 
television broadcasting, radio shows, podcasts, media coverage, 
and school lectures to bring the debates around the ECCC to every 
household around the country, and many across the world.70 As 
Cambodians in the hundreds of thousands tune in to watch daily 
broadcasts, such a level of public engagement is unprecedented 
within genocide trials.71 Consequently, it is evident that levels of 




Drawn-out over decades, inefficient and limited, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have failed in delivering 
Cambodians the reliable truth about their history under the Khmer 
Rouge. As a hybrid tribunal, it has even failed at effectively 
holding the perpetrators of heinous human rights violations 
accountable, has been unable to deliver appropriate punishments, 
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and can only offer limited moral reparations to their victims. 
However, in spite of these glaring failures, the ECCC has not been 
entirely ineffective. With unprecedent success at victim 
participation, support for stronger institutions, a kickstart at 
national reconciliation, and immense public deliberation, the 
tribunal has allowed Cambodians to confront the atrocities of their 
past and to take steps towards recovery. This analysis has 
demonstrated an expanded definition of justice and effectiveness 
that allows for an emphasis on these underlying successes of the 
ECCC. In doing so, it has enabled the identification of modellable 
characteristics within the tribunal for improvement, adaptation, and 
implementation around the world. The ECCC’s motto says, 
“moving forward through justice.” While the tribunal may have 
failed to deliver material justice to the victims of the Khmer 
Rouge, it has had important success in helping Cambodians take 
steps towards “moving forward.”  
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